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In Capital in the 21st Century, Piketty takes a central liberal claim about 
economic inequality seriously and asks: does capitalism reward merit? If true, 
we would expect salaries, presumably rooted in the reward of merit in the 
workplace, to be more important to personal wealth than inherited money and 
property, which is just luck. He concludes that capitalism does not reward merit 
more than inherited wealth. Piketty suggests that this is at once a political and 
moral problem. As such, it cannot be resolved through economics alone, 
especially in the profession’s current incarnation, characterized by 
mathematical fetishization. Instead, all of the social sciences and humanities 
should be mobilized to develop a full description and analysis of economic 
inequalities, which must then be made a central question for broad, public 
debate. This is an important epistemological and political argument, although 
Capital in the 21st Century has critical weaknesses. These include an 
undertheorized empiricism, a tendency to treat economic inequality as a matter 
of money and not as a social relationship, and a failure to grasp how class, 
gender, race and age come together in social relationships of exploitation (and 
not merely as a statistical relationship of inequality). 
 
Keywords 
Capital; economic inequality; exploitation; justice; Marx; Piketty 
 
 
In Capital in the 21st Century,2 Piketty takes a central liberal claim about economic                                                         
1 I would like to thank Marjorie Griffen Cohen for inviting me to be part of the 2015 Congress session she 
organized on Piketty’s book and Mara Fridell for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
2 All references are to Piketty’s (2013) book in French: Le Capital au XXIe siècle, éditions Seuil, Paris, 
France. The translations into English are mine, and are cited with page numbers only. 
Socialist Studies / Études socialistes 11 (1) Winter 2016  
inequality seriously and asks: does capitalism reward merit? He argues that if this were 
true we would expect salaries, presumably rooted in the reward of merit in the workplace, 
to be more important to personal wealth than inherited money and property, which is 
just luck.3 His conclusion is that capitalism does not reward merit more than inherited 
wealth. In fact, using data mainly but not exclusively from what he calls the “rich” or 
developed countries (North America and Europe), he demonstrates that through most of 
the last century, inherited wealth “grows” much more quickly than wealth amassed from 
even relatively high salaries.4 In France, the only exception over the last century was when 
inherited capital, sedimented in the form of property, was literally destroyed in the First 
and Second World Wars, and in the interim economic crisis. Hence, growing (if cross-
nationally variable) inequality is a persistent feature of capitalism, which rewards 
inherited wealth more than “merited” salary-based wealth. This tendency towards greater 
returns on inherited rather than “merited” wealth from salaried incomes is unjust, even 
from a liberal perspective that defends merit-based inequality. The normative, political 
question then becomes how to regulate globalized capital to reduce such inequalities in 
ways that are “at once just and efficient” (752).In the final chapters of the book Piketty 
considers possible redistributive initiatives, like a Europe-wide tax on wealth (859-864), 
as a means to a more just and efficient world capitalist economy. 
 
                                                         
3 Or as Piketty succinctly formulates the liberal claim: “The central question: work or inheritance?” (380-
383). We might ask, with analytical Marxist philosophers (eg., Cohen 1989), if “merit” is not a question of 
luck, too, for instance, the luck of “good genes” or of being in an historical moment where certain 
tendencies happen to be rewarded as “merit,” as when obsessive compulsive behaviours are rewarded as 
meticulous work habits. 
4 As Piketty makes clear, he is sceptical of claims that salaries reflect rewards for talent and hard work (see 
524-533). He observes, for instance, that the highest salaries are now so astronomical in many rich 
countries that it is difficult to justify them as “merit-based”. In practice, he suggests that high salaries 
frequently result from a small pool of similarly situated individuals collectively deciding such salaries—
more or less “for themselves.” High salaries reflect self-reward rather than any objective merit. Moreover, 
the existence of any given high salary creates mimetic pressures, to use a vocabulary that Piketty does not, 
for similarly high salaries in other workplaces and sectors. Salaries are less a consequence of merit than 
demands arising from comparisons of similar position, regardless of how well any specific individual 
performs in that position. Further, the fact that CEO salaries do not rise and fall with markets, instead 
remaining uniformly high, suggests that these salaries are not, in fact, related to “merit” since they do not 
decline when there is worse market performance (although, of course, it is also true that no single CEO is 
responsible for the performance of financial markets as a whole). Finally, the idea of “merit” in the 
comparative sense that CEO A “merits” more pay from better performance than CEO B, because CEO A is 
more dynamic and generates more profits, supposes information that few companies have—they rarely 
have the time and resources to ‘test’ competing CEOs in identical conditions and then offer more pay to the 
better-performing individual. For all these reasons, Piketty is sceptical of claims that high salaries are linked 
to merit. 
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Inequality as a Political and Ethical Problem 
 
In developing this overall argument, Piketty makes several distinct, but related 
contributions. Although none of these claims are revolutionary as politics or as theory, 
they are useful within the particular historical moment, challenging a number of 
hegemonic claims by many contemporary economic “experts”. In that sense, Piketty’s 
book meaningfully opens space for critical dialogues around economic inequalities as a 
political matter of concern to all, even as his explanatory and often conceptual framework 
remains thin. Despite these shortcomings, here are seven contributions he does make: 
 First, Piketty painstakingly describes variations in economic inequality over more 
than a century in Europe and to some extent other nations, using both existing and original 
databases. This continues work since his early doctoral days towards constructing 
databases enabling him (and others) to describe and analyse inequalities in France, other 
European countries, and throughout the world (e.g.Piketty 1997; Piketty 2001; Atkinson 
and Piketty 2010). In wealthy countries, he argues, “new political regulations, taxation 
and public controls on capital” (76) emerging out of the two world wars and the Great 
Depression, led to a brief post-war decline in the importance of inherited wealth 
compared to “merited” wealth from salaries. But the relative importance of inherited 
wealth then rapidly increased along with economic inequalities more generally, from the 
early 1980s up to the present. This was the consequence of the combination of new 
“conservative” economic policies in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the globalization of financial capital and 
deregulation since the 1990s (summary from p.76).  
 At the same time, Piketty documents important cross-national variations in the 
historical transformations of economic inequalities, whether from inherited wealth or 
salaries, and he describes the sometimes-unique causes of those national differences. 
American economic inequalities from 1980-2010, for instance, are partly due to the 
emergence of “super-salaries” (471-474) that have not yet been equalled in other nations, 
including most of Europe and Japan (508-9). In short, the book contributes to the 
empirical description of changing economic inequalities in much of the world, arguing 
that contemporary economic inequalities in many nations now match record levels of 
inequality from 1910-1920. 
 Second, Piketty is explicit—even pedagogical—about the strengths, limitations and 
inevitable incompleteness of the data and statistics that he uses (941). He insists that all 
data is socially “constructed” and warns against “fetishizing” any economic or social 
statistic as a “mathematical certitude” (103). He explains the rationale behind his 
decisions to use particular statistical representations. He prefers to describe the 
distribution of total revenue and total inherited wealth by deciles and centiles, for 
instance, over “synthetic” indicators like the Gini index of inequality. Not least, he 
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explains, the former, expressed as money, are easier to viscerally understand than a 
“fictional” statistical unit like the Gini index (417-420). Hence, he tends towards 
descriptive statements like the following (to closely paraphrase): the 5% group, that is the 
richest 5% of Americans, had “annual revenues…between 108 000 and 150 000 dollars 
per household” in the year 2010, compared to annual revenues superior to 352 000 dollars 
for the 1% in the same year (467). Or: within the 1% in contemporary France, income 
from work is often supplementary compared to the principal income, derived from 
inherited wealth and derivatives (dividends and interest, rents) (443)…  
 At the same time, Piketty is straightforward about the political uses and abuses of 
different statistical presentations of inequality. He argues that the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) indicators, for instance, rarely 
describe the distribution of income and inherited wealth within the top 10%. He regrets 
that such approximations lead to a falsely “softened” image of contemporary inequality 
(420-421), inevitably distorting critical political debates around such inequalities. In 
contrast, his own work seeks to present data concerning the top 5% and the top 1% (or 
even top 0.1%) in salary revenues and, whenever feasible, with respect to inherited wealth. 
In short, Piketty is explicit about the strengths and limits of different data sources and 
explains how the presentation of data is likely to influence political decisions. 
 Third, Piketty posits inequality as opposed to poverty as a central political and 
moral concern, not least for purported democracies. If politics is about common goods and 
common projects, which demand financing (33), then inequality necessarily enters into 
the debate about each individual’s equitable contribution, given their unequal resources, 
to the financing of the common good. Specifically, Piketty suggests that in democratic 
societies all human beings have equal rights to education, health and old age security as 
basic goods (766), even if they may be unequal in other areas of life. (Piketty does not 
seem preoccupied with the origins of the consensus he claims exists around universal 
access to education, health and old age security as “basic” goods). Without transparent 
information concerning unequal incomes and wealth, it is impossible to equitably and 
efficiently allocate individual resources to common goods and projects. For this reason, 
inequality—and not only poverty—is a major political concern.  
 Further, political concerns around inequality are inevitably intertwined with 
moral, ethical questions. Thus, Piketty begins chapter one with a reference to the deaths 
of 34 striking workers at the Marikana platinum mine in South Africa in August 2012 
(71-75, see also 939). He does so as a dramatic reminder of the real violence (74), as well 
as symbolic violence, that accompanies political and social conflict over economic 
inequality. At stake in such struggles, he argues, are vital questions about “what is just and 
what is not” (74). In particular, he claims, poverty like that among the miners is 
particularly morally and politically intolerable when those who appropriate profits from 
production do not work, which is the case of the mine owners. This is another reason that 
inequality and not only poverty must be centred in social scientific work: because it is a 
 COBURN: Economic Inequality Matters  
major social and political issue, even a matter of life and death struggle. In his view, the 
question of inequalities originating in wealth generated from inherited property and from 
poverty despite work is of particular ethical concern. 
 Fourth and relatedly, Piketty emphasizes that inequality is a political, not 
“technical,” matter, requiring wide-ranging public debate beyond specialized circles of 
experts. He argues that the careful conceptualization of key terms around inequality and 
related economic concerns is critical to public debates; as is the systematic assembly and 
study of relevant data (18). But Piketty insists that if such scholarly contributions inform 
wide-ranging political discussions about inequality and redistribution among the broader 
public, they can never substitute for them. Indeed, he writes that inequality “interests 
everyone” and “so much the better”. In an instance of what many will argue is wishful 
thinking, not least given the current reign of the “troika” in Greece, he argues: “Happily, 
democracy will never be replaced by the republic of experts” (17). In this book, his largely 
successful effort to write in an accessible way, for a broader audience likewise expresses 
this commitment to enlarging the public debate around inequality beyond circles of 
certified, professional “experts”, including himself.5  
 Fifth and again relatedly, Piketty rejects an economistic monopoly around questions 
of inequality and political economy more generally, instead calling for contributions to 
these debates by all the social sciences, humanities, and the arts.6 He insists that “other 
social scientific researchers must not leave the study of economic facts to economists” 
(947), especially given that hegemonic American economics is still dominated by an 
“infantile passion for mathematics” (63). He suggests that economics is, at best, a “sub-                                                        
5 This commitment to public debates around economic inequalities is consistent with Piketty’s earlier works 
and his role as a ‘public intellectual’ in France. Typically, for instance, one year before the 2012 French 
Presidential elections, he co-authored a slim, accessible book (Landais, Piketty and Saez 2011) calling for a 
‘fiscal’ revolution. The book was launched simultaneously with an accessible website allowing users to 
simulate the effect of different tax policies on the French economy (www.revolution-fiscale.fr). The authors 
insist that, “The main objective of this new tool is to permit citizens to take ownership of the fiscal question 
and to thus contribute to the emergence of a broad public debate” (Landais, Piketty and Saez 2011:10). 
Likewise, Pieketty’s efforts to encourage debates around economics among broader non-specialist publics 
include a regular column in the left-leaning daily Libération and a blog with the left of centre daily Le 
Mondeas well as frequent interventions in print, radio and television. As of August 2015, Le Monde had 
published over 590 articles referencing Thomas Piketty in some way. (Incidentally, 335 of these are from 
before September 2012, a year before he published Capital in the XXI Century, suggestive of his public 
stature in France even prior to his latest book). 
6 As a recent article by Fourcade, Ollion and Algan (2015) describes, the top-ranked American economics 
journals are particularly insular, at least when compared with sociology. Extra-disciplinary citations since 
the end of World War II are stable at about 19-25%, so that the vast majority of citations are to other 
economists. In the case of extra-disciplinary citations, these refer to finance, statistics, business, political 
science, mathematics, sociology and law (102). Piketty’s explicit appreciation for other disciplinary insights 
into economic inequality, especially the role of the humanities, stands in striking contrast to such routine 
disciplinary insularity in the American context.  
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discipline” (945) in political economy, alongside “history, sociology, anthropology, 
political science and so many others.” In addition, he maintains that the humanities offer 
important insights. In particular, literature is an entry into understanding the “concrete 
and embodied” experiences (17) of historically changing and nationally specific 
inequalities. Novels, for instance, may be uniquely helpful in describing the ways that 
economic relations of inequality have “implacable consequences” in men and women’s 
lives, “their marriage strategies, their hopes and their unhappiness” (17). 
Epistemologically committing to this stance, his book frequently uses examples from 
literature, notably Balzac and Austen (e.g. 377-383, 653-662). These authors are 
mobilized to illustrate the concrete, personal dilemmas created in societies where 
inherited wealth dominates over “merited” wealth from salaries, in ways that are at the 
same time highly structured by gendered laws of inheritance. The “economy” is thus 
imagined as necessarily subject to analysis from all disciplines. Each has critical insights 
into economic life as a concrete, embodied experience against those who understand “the 
economy” as an abstract, reified sphere separate from formal political and social life. 
 Sixth, Piketty offers political solutions to the problem of inequality on a national, 
European, and worldwide basis. He suggests that developing solutions to inequality 
requires, first and foremost, greater transparency about income both from work and 
inherited wealth. Pragmatically, he argues that such transparency may be facilitated, for 
instance, by laws requiring the automatic transmission of domestic and foreign bank 
account information, as an initial step towards what he acknowledges is currently a 
“utopian” project of a global tax on capital (836-852). Such transparency is necessary so 
that a whole range of democratic participatory measures, not limited to the contrasting 
mechanisms of the market and the vote (938), may be mobilized and invented. These new 
democratic forms must allow for everyday citizens to become informed and, especially, to 
“intervene” in economic decision-making. This transparency, he argues, is the ground 
zero for democratic decision-making in economic life, which includes the workplace and 
not merely the formal political realm, as he makes clear when he evokes the murders of 
South African striking miners (939). 
 Finally, it is worth noting Piketty’s sometimes simmering, sometimes overflowing 
expressions of moral outrage at many contemporary economic inequalities. This is not a 
“stylistic” matter but consistent with his affirmation that economic questions are 
profoundly political and moral questions. His discussion of “Vautrin’s discourse” (377-
380), named after a mercenary, murderous character in Balzac, is a good example. He 
summarizes this character’s lucid, if morally repugnant arguments. The aim is to illustrate 
the impossibility of rewards from work equalling inherited wealth, even in the luckiest of 
circumstances, in 19th century France. At the same time, Vautrin is offered up as a 
straightforward parable concerning the moral depravity encouraged by unequal societies. 
As Piketty recounts, Vautrin explains to his friend that, “social success through study, 
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merit and work is an illusion” (378). Even in a brilliant law career will offer only a 
“mediocre” salary compared to the possibilities offered through inherited wealth. Given 
this state of affairs, he advises his “friend” to marry a young woman for money but also to 
murder her brother, who would otherwise be the heir, in order to secure his future 
fiancée’s inheritance. With the clear intent of offering a moral for the present, Piketty 
concludes the tale with the following question: if economic inequalities in any society are 
achieved unjustly and immorally, through inheritance rather than work, why not allow 
any immoral pathways to wealth, up to and including murder? (380-381).  
 Elsewhere, he refers to wealth as the result (“sometimes”) of “theft” (713), a theft 
whose initial injustice is subsequently compounded by the “automatic” economic gains 
accruing to large fortunes in the absence of appropriate taxation. He also mentions, in 
passing, Tolstoy’s 1926 description of “the capitalist horror” (713), even if he insists at 
other moments that he is interested in denouncing neither economic inequalities nor 
capitalism per se but only unjust inequalities and unjust aspects of capitalism (62). 
Positivists will argue that expressions of outrage negatively affect his “objectivity” as an 
economic scientist. But post-positivists will understand that this ethical outrage and 
political commitment vitally informs the ambition, energy and scope of the political 
economy at the heart of this book.  
 In short, Piketty’s arguments are important, even salutary, at least for the 
contemporary moment within capitalism if not for all time. He challenges many current, 
hegemonic economic claims and methodologies. Specifically, against those, like the 
World Bank, who strive for a “world without poverty” (World Bank 2016), he insists on 
reviving the debate around inequality and questions of redistribution. (Of course, at the 
same time, his book participates in and reflects the success of broader struggles, like the 
Occupy movement, that have sought to put inequality on the political agenda by 
critiquing the power of “the 1%” vs. “the 99%” (Pickerill and Krinsky 2012)). He insists 
on the importance of the systematic study of carefully assembled empirical data to 
informed discussions but he argues against those who would pretend that data analysis 
alone can resolve economic questions. Instead, he urges broad, public debate around 
economic concerns, concerns that are at once political and moral—about what is just and 
what is not. He rejects those who would claim that economic problems are “technical” 
problems requiring technical fixes by a small group of experts, claims often made 
explicitly or implicitly by officials at central banks and institutions like the International 
Monetary Fund.7 Rather, economic question raise major political and ethical questions of 
concern to all in democratic societies. At the same time, he challenges pseudo-scientific 
claims to objectivity, reminding scholars of the socially constructed nature of all data. In 
particular, he is forthrightly opposed to the statistical fetishization of economic data so                                                         
7 For one description, written for a general audience, of the ways economics is presented as a “technical” 
concern properly the reserve of professional economics, see Coburn 2016.  
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prominent in American economic journals and in publications by institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund. Statistical truths are inevitably partial truths; and they are 
only one kind of truth. Hence, he argues that all disciplines in the social sciences, 
humanities and arts must be mobilized to address “economic” matters. Finally, he makes 
all this arguments from an unusual standpoint: as a white, male economist who is a 
celebrated scholar in both the United States and in France. 8 Although Piketty is not 
responsible for the ways that his position reflects gendered, racialized and even broader 
political-economic power (e.g., France as a former empire and the USA as the declining 
hegemon), it is likely that this partly explains why he is taken seriously within broader 
publics and the mass media despite his “heterodox” views.  
 
Critiques and Caveats 
 
Yet, despite Piketty’s contributions to challenging some damaging, mainstream 
economic claims, he can be criticized on multiple grounds. Here are just three: 
First, the title of his book inevitably leads to disappointed expectations, especially 
from those working from historical materialist traditions. If he had called his book, 
Economic inequalities: Wealth from work and inheritance over the last 100 years it would 
be easier to overlook the ways that his much more modest enterprise compares 
unfavourably to Marx’s revolutionary three-volume Capital, which develops a theoretical 
framework for understanding capitalism, contributing vital concepts like mode of 
production, use vs. exchange value and drawing out the complexity of exploitative class 
relationships, as well as providing extraordinary detail about everyday suffering in 
working class life in 19th century England (about which more below). It is ironic, too, that 
Piketty suggests that Marx’s failing is that he was overly theoretical and insufficiently 
committed to developing and systematically studying the empirical data, which did not 
support his arguments (p.x). From a historical materialist perspective, it is Piketty who is 
problematic—but for the opposite reason, appearing to fall into undertheorized 
empiricism. Much of the time, the book reads as one description after another of 
historical transformations and cross-national variations in economic inequality without 
any underlying causal model to explain these. These transformations “just happen”. In                                                         
8 At an unusually young age, Piketty was accepted into the highly selective Ecole Normale Supérieure for his 
post-secondary studies. By his thirties, he was decorated as France’s most promising young economist in a 
national award and he had been appointed to director the Ecole d’économie de Paris, meant to rival the 
London School of Economics, as well as being an award-winning Director of Research at the Ecole des 
Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, France’s foremost school of social science. Last year he was to be 
honoured with a knighthood, an “honour” which he refused, unsurprisingly since it was offered by the 
Socialist Hollande government, which has consistently shut out the politically-active Piketty from economic 
policy-making. As Professor Mara Fridell observed to me, however, it is perhaps not unusual to see a white 
man with such a trajectory forcefully reject the injustice of inheritance and place an emphasis on ‘merit’!  
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the absence of any explicit explanatory framework, Piketty’s undertheorized account 
furthermore tends to deny the political agency that he implies is so important around 
economic inequalities (and, to use a concept that he does not, around capitalist 
relationships of exploitation). 
To give a concrete example: we read, in sometimes important detail, about the 
individual lives of the very wealthy. There are, for instance, the descriptions—not 
untinged with moral disgust—of billionaire Lakshmi Mittal’s grotesquely luxurious 
multiple residences in London, the United Kingdom (p.x). But alongside such 
descriptions there is very little to suggest the political power of the wealthy (who are not 
described as capitalists, but in strictly statistical terms as, for instance, “the 1%”) as a class 
or group. Conversely, there is very occasionally a clear statement that working class 
mobilization matters to economic inequality. Hence, in a rare instance, Piketty refers to 
“the central role played by movements for the minimum wage in explaining the evolution 
of wage inequalities in France since 1950” (488). But such recognition of political agency 
is the exception rather than the rule. The unfortunate use of language about iron “laws” 
rather than economic tendencies within capitalism (e.g., p. x), likewise arguably obscures 
the role of both an active, self-interested capitalist class and of working and subaltern 
movements seeking to defend their interests. In short: the deliberate, political struggles of 
both classes are nearly entirely absent from Piketty’s account, although these have been 
critical to changes to the welfare state and subsequently to economic inequality in 
different historical periods and across different national contexts. No alternative 
explanation, much less explicit theorization of capitalism as an economic “system”, is 
offered to explain the historical and cross-national variations in economic inequality that 
he describes in such empirical detail. If Marx offered a whole new way of understanding 
capitalism, against hegemonic economistic accounts by Ricardo (1996) and Smith (2000), 
Piketty’s description of economic inequalities—while a valuable empirical account—is 
undertheorized and its usefulness ultimately limited as political economy for that reason. 
Second, if we are to take Piketty’s title seriously and compare with Marx’s 
monumental work, another striking aspect of the former’s is his “thin” conception of 
capital as property and accumulated wealth. This contrasts unfavourably with Marx’s 
thick understanding of capital as a social relationship of exploitation. To offer a literary 
analogy: if Piketty spends time with Austen and the marriage market of middle class 
women, Marx’s Capital makes us understand the human suffering in Dickensian detail. 
Piketty is worried about money; Marx is concerned to show capital as a social 
relationship. In Capital, therefore, we are told, in vivid and often heartrenching detail, 
about the everyday labour of seven to thirteen year old children, working as much as 
sixteen hour days in the pottery  industry. We hear about grotesquely inadequate daily 
and hourly wages, but at the same time about the social relationships of capital as 
manifest in everyday labour: a father recounting how he “knelt down to feed (his seven-
year old son) as he stood by the machine, for he could not leave it or stop” (Marx 
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1906:272). Put another way: from Piketty, we hear quite a lot about money, especially the 
ways that advantageous marriages to a rich heir promises the quickest route to a life of 
economic ease. But we hear much less about the social realities of historical and 
contemporary capitalism in everyday working class lives. A near-total absence of a 
consideration of race, gender, age, as well as the idea of class, likewise reflects this weak 
understanding of capital as money rather than as an exploitative social relationship. 
Despite a recognition of the role played by slavery in the American economy (250-258), 
for instance, even the mention of the deaths of the Black miners in South Africa is silent 
on the ways that racist legacies of apartheid make Black working class lives, in particular, 
without worth beyond their instrumental value as cheap labour. Nor does Piketty 
consider the ways that gender matters to capitalism, so that there is a virtually total 
absence of consideration of the role of women’s unpaid socially reproductive labour to 
the capitalist mode of production. The consequence is that Piketty sometimes reads as if 
economic inequality was “just” an argument about money while Marx reminds us that 
such economic inequalities are an outcome of a capitalist mode of production that shapes 
social existence for all classes, classes made up of social beings who are routinely 
racialized, gendered and sexualized.  
Third, from a strictly ethical perspective, even non-Marxists might ask about the 
limits of taking seriously the liberal premise that economic inequalities that arise from 
“unearned” wealth are particularly morally reprehensible. Instead, it might be argued that 
gross economic inequalities, whatever their origins— “merited” or not—are problematic 
if we believe that all human beings are equal. Put another way: even if every wealthy 
person were a genius fully using their unique talents and every poor person both 
objectively limited in talent and objectively lazy, we might object to the former living in 
great luxury while the latter live in more or less significant "merited" discomfort.  Piketty 
suggests that main ethical question is the liberal problem of meritocracy, but it might be 
argued that this is not, ultimately, very interesting as a moral focus. Rather, if we take 
human equality seriously, then the real question is how to politically transform existing 
social relationships towards a rough economic equality across all human beings. In short, 
the problem with capitalism is not that it is not meritocratic, but that it is so 




Many other critiques and caveats are possible. For instance, Piketty calls on the 
use of all the social sciences in the study of economic inequalities, but his own work 
ignores almost all these contributions, whether by feminist sociologists (eg., Acker 2006), 
analytical philosophers (eg., Cohen 2000), social geographers (eg., Harvey 2005:15-19), or 
others. There is, further, an unacknowledged tension between his hints at an expanded 
space for democratic action, including in the workplace (938), and his tendency in much 
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of the text to follow liberals in separating out economics and the formal political sphere.  
Nonetheless, he makes some important contributions. In the contemporary 
historical moment, the most important of these, perhaps surprisingly, are 
epistemological: his rejection of naïve positivism, statistical fetishism, and economistic 
monopolies for understanding economic inequalities, alongside his embrace of insights 
from the arts, humanities, and the social sciences. Finally, his suggestion that a whole 
range of democratic interventions are welcome in the economy, beyond the market and 
the vote (938) — while remaining undeveloped — arguably points towards a politics of 
transformation that is necessary within a world capitalist system where economic 
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